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VOTING POWER IN THE GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
by Dennis Leech, University of Warwick
Non Technical Summary
This paper examines how the rules of the IMF and their implementation affect the voting
power of its member countries and its capacity to make decisions, and makes
recommendations for changes.
Fundamental decision making at the IMF uses a system of weighted voting in which member
countries and executive directors cast different numbers of votes reflecting their respective
financial contributions. It is well known that a property of such weighted voting systems
(other examples are the EU Council of Ministers, shareholders' meetings in joint stock
companies) is that a member’s power - in the sense of its general ability to influence
decisions - is not the same as its share of the votes. The system is designed to give power
unequally to different members but its implementation might result in too much or too little
inequality.
The most important decisions require special majorities of 85% of the votes, giving the USA
- with over 17 percent - an effective veto. This very high majority requirement has been
criticised as both likely to make the decision making system too rigid and also to be
damaging to American sovereignty by making it easier for others to block US proposals.
When the Bretton Woods system was being planned in 1943, John Maynard Keynes warned
of this.
This paper uses game-theoretic measures of voting power to answer the following questions:
1. Is the inequality of voting power between countries a fair reflection of the differences
in their respective contributions?
2. How does the size of the majority requirement employed affect the voting powers of
the main contributors and the effectiveness of the IMF in being able to make
decisions by majority voting?
3.  How should the votes be weighted to give each country a given share of the power to
influence decisions in general?
The findings, using the voting weights for 1999, are that:
(1)  Countries' voting powers over ordinary decisions are much more unequal than their
financial contributions; the power of the USA is much greater than its nominal 17%
of the votes.
(2)  The effect of the special 85% majority requirement for major decisions is to severely
limit the effectiveness of the decision-making system.
(3)  The use of the 85% majority requirement is counterproductive to the US pursuing an
active role in the IMF by limiting its power to have its policies accepted.
(4)  The IMF should make all decisions by simple majority and scrap special majorities.
That would make its democratic decision making system most effective.
(5)  The United States should support the use of simple majorities for all decisions if it
wishes to increase its influence within a democratic IMF.
(6)  Votes of all members and executive directors should be reweighted in order to give
the desired share of voting power to each country and director.
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ABSTRACT:
In general in an organisation whose system of governance involves weighted voting, a
member's weight in terms of the number of votes and the formal power it represents differ.
Power indices provide a means of analysing this difference. The  paper uses new algorithms
for computing power indices for large games. Three analyses are carried out: (1) the
distribution of Banzhaf voting power among members in 1999; the results show that the
United States has considerably more power over ordinary decisions than its weight of 17%
but that the use of special supermajorities limits its power; (2) the effect of varying the
majority requirement on the power of the IMF to act and the powers of members to prevent
and initiate action (Coleman indices); the results show the effect of supermajorities severely
limits the power to act and therefore renders the voting system ineffective in democratic
terms, also the sovereignty of the United States within the IMF is effectively limited to just
the power of veto; (3) the paper proposes the determination of the weights instrumentally by
means of an iterative algorithm to give the required power distribution; this would be a useful
procedure for determining appropriate changes in weights consequent on changes to
individual countries' quotas; this is applied to the 1999 data. Policy recommendations are,
first, that the IMF use only simple majority voting, and discontinue using special
supermajorities, and, second, allocate voting weight instrumentally using power indices.
Keywords: Power Indices; Banzhaf Index; Coleman Index; IMF; Keynes.
1VOTING POWER IN THE GOVERNANCE OF THE IMF
The system of governance of the IMF is of considerable interest as a research topic
not only because of the crucial importance of international financial organisations to the
management of the world economy in an era of increasing globalisation. Current discussions
surrounding the reform of the architecture of the international economic institutions give it
unprecedented topical relevance. The IMF is also a worthwhile subject of research from the
general point of view of the design of voting systems because it is one of a number of
international organisations that operate on the basis of the weighted voting power of their
members (the World Bank, the European Union Council of Ministers and regional
development banks are some of the others; in contrast, for example to the United Nations
General Assembly or the World Trade Organisation which use one-member-one-vote).
Weighted voting is used because inequality of voting power between countries is a
fundamental design feature intended to reflect inequality of contributions of resources.
However, weighted voting raises the important question of whether the resulting inequality of
power over actual decisions is precisely what was intended for the relationship between
power and contribution.
 On any reasonable definition of voting power as a measure of its ability to influence
voting outcomes, there is not an exact correspondence between a member's power and its
nominal voting strength. It has long been known (e.g. Shapley and Shubik [29], Banzhaf [1],
Coleman [3]) that in general, in a body which makes decisions by weighted voting, there is
no simple relationship between formal voting power and voting weight1. In many weighted
                                                
1
 In accounts of the IMF voting system the term “voting power” is commonly used to denote the number of
votes (or fraction of the total) commanded by a member country. Since in this paper I am making a fundamental
distinction between this and actual power as defined, I use the term voting weight instead.
2voting bodies which have been studied power has been found to be much more unequally
distributed than nominal votes so that looking only at the latter can give a false picture.
Members with very large voting weight can possess a disproportionately greater voting
power – they have in a sense an extra "invisible weighting" - and other members
proportionately less. Similarly it is possible for individual voters to have no power at all
despite possessing an apparently significant number of votes2.
It is therefore of intrinsic interest to consider the IMF voting system from this point of
view, by analysing the distribution of a priori voting power3. There are only two studies
which have adopted a similar approach to the analysis of power in the IMF to the one
employed here: those by Dreyer and Schotter [4] and Strand et.al. [31]. Analysing the current
voting system using the game -theoretic technique of voting power indices to find the
distribution of power between member countries which results from weighted voting is the
first aim of this paper.
At the original Bretton Woods conference during the Second World War, at which the
plans for what became the IMF and World Bank were originally agreed, the design of the
voting system was an important area of debate in which significant differences emerged
between the British and American delegations. The United States was always concerned to
retain a national veto for itself over the most important decisions while the British preference
was for simple majority voting in all matters. The American proposal was that major
decisions would require a special majority of four-fifths of the votes to pass thereby ensuring
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 A well known example of this was Luxembourg in the EEC Council of Ministers before 1973, whose one vote
was never able to make any difference given the votes of the other countries.
3
 This is fundamentally different from attempting to draw conclusions from analyses of observed voting
behaviour. I am concerned here with the formal properties of the voting system and the rules governing the
IMF.
3that the USA, then with 33 percent of the votes, would be able to block any proposals it did
not like. The leader of the British delegation, John Maynard Keynes, criticised this plan and
pointed out that, rather than enhancing America’s sovereignty, it might actually reduce it
because the use of special majorities could also lead to a group of smaller countries being
able to block its own proposals. Nevertheless the American view prevailed and special
majorities have been a fundamental feature of the IMF constitution ever since. I examine this
issue of the choice of majority requirement in detail as the second aim of the paper. The
results provide powerful evidence in support of the insights of Keynes4. The method used is
that of Coleman [3] which emphasises the distinction between the power of a member to
initiate action and its power to prevent action when there is a supermajority requirement,
particularly appropriate in this case. It also gives a measure of the body’s own power to act.
This latter is useful as an indicator of the effectiveness of the voting system as a means of
decision making.
The third question addressed is how the voting weights ought to be allocated in order
to give rise to a given predetermined power distribution. It is a basic principle of the IMF that
a member’s voting power should reflect its financial contribution and therefore it is natural to
choose the voting weights in such a way that the resulting voting powers of members follow
this rule. I propose an iterative algorithm in which voting weights are treated instrumentally
and are chosen so that the associated power distribution, as measured by power indices, is
predetermined.
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 In effect the requirement of a high special majority has other effects than simply giving an American veto: it
makes the distribution of voting power more equal and therefore limits American power within the organisation.
It also reduces the number of votes that result in a decision and therefore limits the effectiveness of the voting
system as a democratic process.
4This paper addresses the following specific questions:
(1)  How does the voting power of individual countries compare with their nominal votes? To
what extent is the degree of inequality in the distribution of votes reflected in the distribution
of voting power?
(2)  Are there important differences in the distribution of voting power between the two main
IMF decision-making bodies, the Board of Governors and the Executive Board?
 (3) Different types of decisions use different decision rules, some requiring a special
supermajority. What effect do different decision rules have on the distribution of power and
also on the power of the voting body itself to act?
(4)  Can we determine what the voting weights should be as the source of a given distribution
of power? I investigate this question taking the different member countries' IMF quotas as the
preferred distribution of power.
The analysis is entirely in terms of formal voting power and the formal constitution as
laid down in the Articles of Agreement and its amendments; the allocation of voting weight
among the members is taken at face value. It is commonplace however to note that the
organisation is in practice dominated by the United States and the advanced industrial nations
since their combined voting weight gives them a majority over the developing countries. The
analysis presented here is not primarily concerned with such questions about the power of
informal groupings of countries.5
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 Although the methodology can obviously and usefully be employed to evaluate and compare the voting power
of groupings which did not have an actual majority. For example it would be possible to use this approach to
comment on the criticisms made by developing countries that the distribution of voting power has been too
heavily weighted towards developed countries. This is a consequence of a fundamental aspect of the design of
5Despite the importance that member countries attach to the voting system, and to their
relative voting strengths within it6, in practice actual votes are very rarely called in meetings
of the IMF.7 Indeed they are deliberately avoided, especially in the Executive Board, in order
"to avoid the element of confrontation associated with a contested vote"; decisions are taken
only after discussion leading to a consensus whenever possible. It might therefore be
suggested that an analysis of voting power is beside the point if all decisions are taken by
consensus. However, formal voting procedures have a fundamental influence over the de
facto decision making process; power relationships are fundamentally determined by relative
voting strengths and the fact that member countries or directors are not called on to cast their
votes in meetings is a reflection that these are well understood. The distribution of voting
power provides a framework within which bargaining takes place between countries before a
decision is taken.
1. Formal Decision Making in the IMF
There are two decision-making bodies: the Board of Governors and the Executive
Board8. All powers of the IMF are vested in the Board of Governors, which delegates to the
Executive Board authority to exercise all except certain specified reserved powers; the
                                                                                                                                                       
the IMF that dominant voting power should be in the hands of creditor nations who provide the resources. Our
analysis should be able to illuminate the extent to which this aim is fulfilled in practice or whether the “invisible
weighting” of the United States and other large creditors skews the power distribution even further away from
the debtor countries.
6
 See Zamora [32]; also Sadako [28] for an account of the campaign mounted by Japan to increase its voting
weight.
7
 There is an analogy between voting and power distributions among the countries which are members of the
IMF and those among shareholders of a commercial joint stock company (the Board of Governors
corresponding to the shareholders’ meeting). Although it is relatively rare for them to cast their votes in ballots
taken at company AGMs, nevertheless large investors are influential with top management because their voting
weight is powerful in a formal sense. There is an important structural difference with joint stock companies
however in that weighted voting is a central feature of the day-to-day operations of the IMF, in the Executive
Directors as well as the Board of Governors, whereas the directors of a commercial company do not use
weighted voting.
6Executive Board is responsible for the general operations of the IMF.9 The powers exercised
by the Board of Governors and expressly reserved to it by the Articles of Agreement refer to
matters of a fundamental or political nature or which may have a profound economic impact;
these include the power to admit new members, require a member to withdraw, approve a
revision of quota and determine the number of Executive Directors who are elected. Some
powers are vested in the Executive Board and the exercise of them does not depend on
delegation from the Board of Governors, such as the election of the Managing Director and
the power to suspend or terminate suspension of certain provisions. As well as exercising the
powers either vested in them or delegated to them, an important role of the Executive Board
is to make recommendations to the Board of Governors about decisions which the latter is to
take. The Board of Governors delegates much actual policymaking to the Executive Board
and its own meetings are often therefore largely ceremonial.
The Board of Governors, which in 1999 had 178 members, comprises one governor
appointed by each member country -usually the minister of finance or the governor of its
central bank - and meets biannually. Decisions, in the form of resolutions, are taken by a
simple majority of the votes cast except on certain matters requiring an 85% special majority.
The executive directors, who are officials rather than politicians, are either appointed or
elected. Like the Board of Governors, the Executive Board employs weighted voting and
therefore it is appropriate to consider its composition and analyse the distribution of voting
power among the executive directors separately from the Board of Governors. There are
currently twenty  four executive directors, five appointed by the five member countries
                                                                                                                                                       
8
 See Gold [10] for a full account of the constitution of the IMF.
9
 The effective governing  body is the International Monetary and Financial Committee (previously known as
the Interim Committee) consisting of ministers of countries with seats on the Executive Board. This study,
however, is concerned only with the formal rules of decision making.
7having the largest quotas, and nineteen elected by the other members. Elections of executive
directors are held every two years. There is a minimum and a maximum percentage of the
eligible votes that a nominee must receive in order to be elected. In practice the minimum
percentage requirement means directors normally need the votes of more than one country in
order to be elected. There are currently three single-country constituencies, however: China,
Russia and Saudi Arabia. The principle behind the requirement of a minimum percentage
vote is to encourage the formation of coalitions of members with common interests who elect
directors to represent them, while the requirement of a maximum percentage prevents too
great disparities in the voting strength of individual elected directors.
An executive director casts the votes of all those members who voted for him as a unit
and cannot split the vote. With the exception of the three groups of Latin American republics,
the Articles do not associate executive directors with defined regional or other constituencies;
the constituencies are assumed to emerge informally as part of the election process. Members
which combine to form groupings to elect a director engage in negotiations among
themselves through channels which are outside the formal rules of the IMF. However the
operation of the system over the years has led to the creation of several more or less
permanent constituencies most of which have a geographical basis. Some have tended to
elect an executive director from the same country over several elections and have a relatively
stable membership. Some member countries - Australia, Brazil, Belgium, Canada, China,
India, Italy, Netherlands - have provided elected executive directors virtually continuously
since 1946.
Given the existence of the constituencies around the election of executive directors, it
might be considered appropriate in a study such as this one, to model the power relationships
8in the Executive Board in terms of a two-stage process: first, members use their weighted
votes within their group to elect a director; second, their elected director casts their combined
votes as a bloc in the Executive Board. This two-stage approach would assign a greatly
increased voting power to certain members. In 1999, Italy, Canada, Brazil, India, Argentina
and Switzerland all had more than half the votes of the constituency that elected their
directors, and Netherlands, Belgium, Australia and Indonesia were all effectively dominant,
though short of an actual majority. For example the director from Italy, a country with 3.3
percent of the votes, casts 4.27 percent of the votes in the Executive Board on behalf of a
grouping of Mediterranean countries. This two-stage approach, however, has not been
pursued here since it would require the existence of the constituencies to be fixed
independently of the outcome of the first stage, which cannot be assumed under the rules. It
would also require a similar process for the election of directors be followed within each
constituency, which cannot be assumed either; or failing that, at least the researcher would
need knowledge of how decisions are taken10. It is an interesting topic that is not considered
here and remains for future work.
2. The Use of Special Majorities and the views of Keynes
Except as specifically provided for in the Articles, all decisions of both the Board of
Governors and the Executive Board – that is, most of the decisions of the IMF - are made by
a simple majority of the votes cast11. Certain categories of decision, however, require special
85 percent majorities. These tend to be the most important types of decision where a degree
of consensus is needed to make them effective. This supermajority requirement has been set
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 For example the Scandinavian group chooses its director by rotation rather than by voting.
9at a level which gives the United States a veto12. However it also means that groups of other
countries, if they formed a bloc, such as the EU or the developing countries could also have a
veto on proposals by the United States. The use of a special supermajority requirement is
actually a move towards a unanimity rule and in fact results in substantially greater equality
of power, as shown later.
The question of the size of majority required for a decision was a point of
disagreement between the British and American founders of the IMF. Keynes was little
interested in decision rules based on precise formulae and advocated, in effect, that all
decisions be taken by simple majority, in contrast to the Americans who insisted on voting
rules which gave them a veto. Keynes addressed the question in his maiden speech to the
House of Lords (Keynes, [15]): ". . . the requirement in the American plan for a four fifths
majority will be found, if the paper is read carefully, to relate not to all matters by any means,
but only to a few major issues. Whether on second thoughts any one would wish to allow a
negative veto to any small group remains to be seen. For example, the American proposals
might allow the gold-producing countries to prevent the United States from increasing the
gold value of the dollar, even in circumstances where the deluge of gold was obviously
becoming excessive; and in some ways, by reason of their greater rigidity, the American
proposals would involve a somewhat greater surrender of national sovereignty than do our
own." He also wrote (Keynes, [16]): "I disagree strongly, on non-economic grounds, of the
individual country veto-power unless it is granted to all countries regardless of their quotas . .
. . the 80 percent majority rule would limit the power of the US with respect to changes it
                                                                                                                                                       
11
 The rule is in terms of votes cast rather than total votes but this distinction is ignored in this study because of
its emphasis on a priori voting power rather than behaviour.
12
 It was increased from 80 percent in 1969 to allow the USA to keep its veto while reducing its financial
contribution.
10
may desire in an existing status as much as it would increase its power to stop undesired
changes." The results of an analysis of the effect of varying the special majority requirement,
presented below, supports this argument.
3. Voting Weights
Every member of the IMF has a quota expressed in US dollars which is its
subscription to the resources of the organisation and also determines its voting weight. The
votes allotted to a member are equal to a basic two hundred and fifty plus one vote for each
hundred thousand dollars of quota. Thus voting weight varies linearly according to the size of
the quota rather than proportionately. This is one important difference with a business
corporation where votes are strictly proportional to contributions to equity capital. The
existence of the 250 “basic” votes which every member has independently of its quota reflect
concerns expressed at the Bretton Woods conference. It was felt that what was then a radical
move (in an international organisation) of adopting a system of weighted voting for the
Bretton Woods institutions, where the weights reflected economic and financial factors,
should be tempered by the political consideration of the traditional equality of states in
international law. To have allocated votes in proportion to quotas would have meant too close
a similarity with a business corporation and might have given too high a degree of control to
a small group of member countries13.
Basic votes are not increased when quotas increase and for most countries their voting
weight has become almost proportional to their quota as the latter has increased over the
years. The proportion of total votes represented by the combined basic votes has accordingly
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 See Gold [11] and [12].
11
fallen substantially over the years from a high of over 14% in 1956 to 2.1% in 1999. This
decline has been in spite of the increase in the number of members, many of which are
developing countries with very small quotas. However for the great majority of members
their basic votes have become insignificant. For example for Belgium the share of its total
voting weight represented by basic votes has fallen from 10% in 1946 to 0.77% in 1999, for
Mexico it has fallen from 21.7% to 0.96% over the same period.
4. The Measurement of a priori Voting Power
The relationship between a member’s weight and power can be examined by the
method of power indices based on formally treating the voting body as an n-person co-
operative game, specifically here a weighted voting game. Given its general or a priori
nature, which abstracts from the particular identities, characteristics or interests of named
individuals, this approach is useful in the design of constitutions that embody differences in
voting power between members. There are a number of good accounts of power indices but
the best recent treatment is Felsenthal and Machover [6]14. A power index is based on the
idea of power in a weighted voting game as influence over decision making in general, that is
without regard for the issue to be determined and therefore the players’ preferences.
The power of a member of a voting body (in this case a member country of the IMF)
is defined as its ability to join coalitions of other members formed by voting and change them
from losing to winning, or, equivalently, to change them from winning to losing by defecting.
The essential utility of this approach is that it focuses on the theoretically possible outcomes
of the voting system, and bases its account of power on them, rather than simply looking at
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 See also Brams [2], Dubey and Shapley [5], Lucas [23], Roth [27], Straffin [30] and Owen [25].
12
the inputs to the voting system, in terms of the numbers of votes possessed by each member,
and naïvely assuming that these are reflected in power. It extends our understanding by
revealing properties of the voting system15.
A voting body can be thought of as a weighted majority game defined by the set of its
members, N={1,2,…,n}, their voting weights, w1, w2, . . ,wn and a decision rule in terms of a
quota q16. In the present case the weights are proportions so that w i  =  1∑ . A swing for
player i is a coalition represented by a subset S, N ⊇S, i ∉S, and a quota q such that
                   
j ∈S
∑ wj ≤ q   and   
j ∈S
∑ wj + wi > q.
S is a losing coalition while S+{i} is a winning coalition. Let the number of swings for player
i be ηi; this can be written formally ηi = 
S
∑ 1, the summation being taken over all swings.
The total number of swings for all players in the game is 
€ 
η = ηi∑ . Each subset of N, that
does not include i represents the outcome of a vote of all the other n-1 players. The total
number of such possible votes and therefore the maximum possible number of swings for
player i is 2n-1.
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 Power indices have been the subject of repeated trenchant criticisms by Garrett and Tsebelis [8] and [9] who
attacked a study of the EU Council of Ministers by Hosli [13]. They made the extreme claim that “[the method
of power indices] generated no analytic leverage over decision making in the contemporary EU”. They argued
that, because it is concerned with a priori voting power only and ignores preferences, it cannot have anything to
say about behaviour. However, their target is really a straw man because power indices do not claim to model
behaviour, but to be a tool for the design of institutions. See Lane and Berg [17] for a reply. This point was
made very clearly in the seminal contribution by Shapley and Shubik [29].
16
 This is here used as a technical term for the majority requirement and should not be confused with IMF
quotas.
13
In the terminology of game theory17, the games considered here are proper, i.e. games
in which the complement of any winning coalition is necessarily losing, thus ruling out the
possibility of having two contradictory decisions: if S+{i} is winning, then N - S - {i} is
losing. For a general weighted voting game this requires q ≥ Σwi/2, and in this case q ≥ 0.5.
In the analysis of the IMF below, two quotas are taken, q=0.5 or q=0.85, both of which
satisfy this condition.
A proper game does not necessarily lead to a decision, however, because some
coalitions, while not being winning, may be able to prevent a decision. Such a blocking
coalition is a losing coalition whose complement is losing: S is a blocking coalition if both S
and N-S are losing. A strong game is one without blocking coalitions: the complement of a
losing coalition is necessarily winning. A decisive game is then defined as one that is both
proper and strong: in this case the complement of a winning coalition is necessarily losing
(no nonintersecting pair of coalitions being simultaneously winning) and that of a losing
coalition is necessarily winning (no nonintersecting pair of coalitions being both blocking)18.
A power index is an n-vector containing a value for each player. Two Banzhaf
measures of power are defined:
The Non-normalised Banzhaf index for player i is the proportion of votes which are
swings for player i:
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 Dubey and Shapley [5].
18
 Neither of the IMF voting games considered in this paper is decisive. Voting on special decisions requiring
q=0.85 is not a decisive game because it is a non-strong game. This point is important when considering
Coleman’s indices in the next section. Voting on ordinary decisions with q=0.5 may not technically be decisive
depending on the weights of the members: it is possible under the rules for there to be two nonintersecting
coalitions each with a weight of precisely 0.5.
14
     βi′ = ηi/ 2n-1 i=1,2,..,n
This measures the absolute power of each player as a probability. It indicates relative voting
powers of different players but does not have a direct interpretation as giving a power
distribution. For that we use the normalised version, the Banzhaf index.
The Banzhaf index for player i:
βi  =  ηi/η   =   βi′/Σβi′ i=1,2,..,n
The Banzhaf index is the ratio of the number of swings for member i to the total
number of swings for all members. It is interpreted as the share of player i in the power of all
players to influence decisions by means of a swing. The index is normalised to sum to 1 over
all members. This way of thinking about and measuring power has been a fundamental part
of the literature ever since the seminal articles of Shapley and Shubik and of Banzhaf19. It has
its intellectual origin in the parallel between the idea of sharing of power in a legislature and
bargaining among players in a co-operative game, that goes back to the Shapley value (of
which the Shapley-Shubik index was a specialisation).
The literature on power indices casts little light on the relative usefulness of the
Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index as rival measures of power and this
indeterminacy has hindered the wider application of the approach. They have often given
different results where they have been compared in the same application and the literature has
been able to offer little guidance on how to resolve these problems. It is not uncommon for
empirical studies to present analyses using both indices without comment. In this study
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 But not the ancestral article on measuring voting power by Penrose [26]. The non-normalised Banzhaf index
was actually invented by Penrose. Felsenthal and Machover [6] attributed this correctly but I have kept to the
more familiar term here.
15
however I justify my preference for the Banzhaf index on the basis of the critique in Coleman
[3] and by Leech [20]. The latter, a direct empirical comparison in an application to voting in
joint stock companies, found the results using the Shapley-Shubik index to be inconsistent
with independent evidence while the Banzhaf index was not20.
The normalised Banzhaf index provides a measure of the relative power of each
member for a given quota q; it does not permit comparisons between games with different
quotas since the denominator, η , changes with q.  An analysis of the effect of changing the
quota q requires consideration of absolute rather than relative voting power for which a
normalised index is not suitable. The Non-normalised Banzhaf index can be used for such an
analysis. However, when the decision rule requires a supermajority, with the quota q>0.5, the
game ceases to be decisive and blocking power becomes important. It becomes of interest to
make a distinction, in terms of measures of absolute voting power, between a member’s
power to block or prevent a decision, on the one hand, and its power to win or initiate a
decision, on the other. This is especially true of the IMF where the veto power of the United
States is so important to decisions requiring q=0.85. I suggest that the indices proposed by
Coleman are useful for this and these are discussed in the next section.
5. The Power to Act, and the Powers of Members to Initiate and Prevent
Action: The Method of Coleman
A subtly different perspective on power measurement (and a fundamental critique of
the Shapley-Shubik index) was provided in the classic paper by Coleman [3]. This paper is
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 Felsenthal and Machover [6] look into this question very closely and are also somewhat critical of the
Shapley-Shubik index. They make a distinction between I-power and P-power, the former being voting power
on issues which are concerned with public goods, power as influence, while the latter is about issues which
involve a division of the spoils, as in parties forming electoral coalitions and then dividing up the offices among
themselves after winning, as in a presidential system. They argue that the Shapley-Shubik index is inappropriate
16
widely cited but its main points are not taken sufficiently seriously, with many accounts
treating it as essentially just another presentation of the Banzhaf index21. Many authors refer
to the Banzhaf index as the Banzhaf-Coleman index.
In fact Coleman's paper is the foundation of a different approach to the analysis of
power based on a rejection of the idea of sharing power among the members of a legislature.
Coleman argues that the distributional consequences of a decision about public goods, taken
by voting, are particular and cannot be conceived of in terms of a division of the spoils
among members of the winning coalition. A vote usually leads to some action being taken
which has a fixed profile of consequences for the members. Pure public goods are indivisible
and non-excludable and therefore it is inappropriate to imagine them being divided up in
different ways among the members of society.
Coleman argued that when designing the constitution of a voting body it is necessary
to consider not only the power of each individual member, but also that of what he called the
collectivity (in our terms, voting game) itself, which he called the power to act. An example
that illustrates the importance of this distinction, especially when considering what the quota
should be, is as follows. A requirement that all members be unanimous would make it very
unlikely indeed that a decision were ever taken - and therefore the voting body would possess
very little power to act. On the other hand, a very weak requirement - for example if a
decision only required one member to vote for it to pass - would mean that the body would be
very powerful in having a very great power to act. In both cases however members would
                                                                                                                                                       
as a measure of I-power and prefer one of the versions of the Banzhaf index.  Shapley-Shubik indices for the
IMF in 1996 are provided in Leech [19] and, in 1999, in Leech [22].
21
 He did not actually mention the Banzhaf index although his coalitional model was the same.
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have the same power relations: all would have the same value of the normalised Banzhaf
power index, βi =1/n.
This is an important aspect of the design of voting systems; it is necessary to know
not only the relative power of each member but also how much absolute power each
possesses and also the ease of decision making in general, the power to act, which is a
property of the voting body as a whole. In some cases it is important that a constitution make
it difficult for a decision to be made, in order, for example, to protect minorities from
arbitrary decisions taken by the majority, or to force legislators to reconsider their initial
proposals before making a final decision under a system of checks and balances. In other
cases there is a need for a responsive system that makes it easy to take a decision, such as
where actions have to be taken under the urgent pressure of events22.
Coleman defined three indices as follows.
The Power of the Body to Act (PTA)
This is defined for the body itself as the ease with which members' interests in a vote
can be translated into actual decisions. It is measured as the proportion of all the theoretically
possible voting outcomes that give rise to a decision. The index is defined as:
PTA = ω/ 2n
where ω is the number of outcomes that have winning coalitions, and there are 2n voting
outcomes, equal to all the subsets of N. ω depends strongly on the quota q. For example a
unanimity requirement (q= 1) would give ω=1 and a value of PTA equal to 2-n, while a value
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 The capacity of the institution to act has recently been studied in the context of the EU by Hosli [14],
Felsenthal and Machover [7], Leech [21] and others.
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of q=0.5 would give ω=2n-1 giving PTA = 0.5. The power to act satisfies the inequalities:
 2-n≤PTA≤0.5, if 0.5≤q≤1.
The Power of a Member to Prevent Action (PPAi)
The power of a member to prevent action is a measure of its ability to block a
decision by means of a swing. It is the proportion of outcomes with winning coalitions that
are also swings for player i, and therefore represents the capacity of i to change a winning
vote into a losing one. Thus, the power of member i to prevent action is defined as:
PPAi = ηi / ω
The Power of a Member to Initiate Action (PIAi)
The power of player i to initiate action is defined as the number of swings relative to
the total number of voting outcomes that do not have a winning coalition. This index
measures the potential of i to swing a coalition from losing to winning. Thus the power to
initiate action is defined as:
PIA i = ηi / ( 2n - ω).
In general for a proper game, the three absolute indices for player i satisfy:
 0 ≤ PIAi ≤ βi′ ≤ PPAi ≤1.
The distinction between preventing action and initiating action only matters when the
decision rule is based on a supermajority quota. q>0.5, and therefore the game is not decisive.
In the case of simple majority voting, when q=0.5, the game is decisive and the two indices
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are identically equal to each other and to the Non-normalised Banzhaf index. In this case, ω =
2n-1 and therefore:
           PIAi = ηi / ( 2n – 2n-1) = ηi / 2n-1 = PPAi = βi′.
In the general case the relations between the Non-normalised Banzhaf index and
Coleman’s indices can be written:
βi′ = ηi/ 2n-1 = 2(ηi / ω).(ω/2n) = 2 PPAi.PTA,
and βi′ = ηi/ 2n-1 = 2[ηi / ( 2n - ω)]. [( 2n - ω). /2n] = 2 PIAi.[1 - PTA].
The Non-normalised Banzhaf index combines the individual player’s power either to
prevent action or to initiate action with the power of the body as a whole to act23. Moreover,
as has been pointed out many times in the literature, both the Power to Prevent Action and
the Power to Initiate Action are rescalings of the Non-normalised Banzhaf index, and hence
of the Banzhaf index. It is for this reason that the name Banzhaf-Coleman index is often used.
Coleman’s indices, therefore, add nothing to the analysis in two special cases:
(1) where the voting body uses a simple majority rule with a quota q=0.5; and,
(2) where the study of power is in terms of shares, and it is required that the power indices be
normalised to sum to unity. They are, however, a useful tool in other cases. In the study of
the voting system used by the IMF they provide valuable insights into the effect of the choice
of quota on the power to act and also into the trade-offs faced by the members, particularly
                                                
23
 It is also of interest to note that the power index βi can be shown to be the harmonic mean of PIAi and PPAi:
1/βι = (1/PPAi + 1/PIAi)/2 (Dubey and Shapley [5]).
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the USA, between their national powers to prevent or initiate action and the power of the
body to act.
6. The Distribution of Voting Power in the IMF
Banzhaf power indices have been calculated for both voting bodies and for each
majority requirement using the weights for 199924. The results for the Executive Board and
for the larger countries in the Board of Governors are shown in Table 1. Direct comparisons
are possible for the largest five member countries that appoint their own directors, whose
weights in the Executive Board are the same as in the Board of Governors: USA, Japan,
Germany, France and UK; they can also be made for the countries whose director is elected
by a constituency of one: Saudi Arabia, Russia and China.25
Table 1 about here
These results show, first, that the majority requirement is very important and that the
effect of the special 85% supermajority requirement is to equalise voting power to a very
great extent. Second, the results for ordinary decisions using the 50% majority rule show that
power is more unequally distributed than intended. The United States has more power than its
voting weight in both bodies: more than 22 percent in the Executive Directors and 25 percent
in the Board of Governors against 17 percent of the voting weight, all other directors or
members have slightly less power than weight. Therefore for ordinary decisions the existing
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 Voting weights taken from the IMF Annual Report for 1999. All the indices have been computed using the
algorithm in Leech [22] for power indices in large games.
25
 The positions of the latter countries in the table are different  in the two bodies because the weights in the
Executive Board are those cast by directors and those in the Board of Governors those of members; both sides
of the table present the results in order of the voting weight of the country. The algorithm used to find the power
indices, from Leech [22], uses a partition of members into two groups, m large and n-m small. In all the
calculations in this study, I used  m=8.
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weighted voting system disproportionately favours the USA. Third, the results for the largest
five countries in the two bodies are broadly similar for ordinary decisions.
7. The Effect of the Majority Requirement on the Power Index
The results in Table1 show that the distribution of power depends strongly on the
majority requirement q, being very different for ordinary decisions (q=50%) and decisions
requiring special majorities (q=85%). It is therefore of interest from the point of view of
design of the voting system to investigate this effect further. We know that increasing q
makes the power distribution more equal until in the limit when q = 100% power indices are
equal for all members. This analysis may also provide some evidence on the question of the
best majority requirement to use from the point of view of members’ individual voting
powers and the assertion of Keynes quoted above.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 1, and its associated table, shows the effect of varying q on the power indices,
in the Board of Governors, for the largest five countries. On the horizontal axis is the
majority requirement q, varying from 0.5 to 1 in increments of 0.05, and the corresponding
Banzhaf indices on the vertical axis. These results show that the country most affected by the
majority requirement is the USA whose power index declines steeply as q rises. The USA has
little more voting power than any other country for q greater than 75%. The counterpart of
the US loss of power is a very small increase in the power of every other member country.
The conclusion is that in terms of its share of power within the organisation, as measured by
β1, the use of the special majority rule does not benefit the United States.
22
The results of computing the Coleman indices for the different majority requirements
in the Board of Governors are presented in Table 226. Table 2 shows the power to act, and
three power indices, the non-normalised Banzhaf index, the power to prevent action and the
power to initiate action, for the top two countries, the USA and Japan.
Table 2 about here
The results in Table 2 for the power to act are graphed in Figure 2. This shows that
the power to act declines very steeply as the majority requirement increases, becoming
almost negligible beyond 75%. This suggests the conclusion that the practice of requiring
special majorities is to render the IMF formally relatively ineffective as a democratic decision
making body.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 3 shows the Coleman power indices for the largest five countries. The effect of
supermajorities on the power of the United States to prevent action is clear but the graph also
shows the effect on its power to initiate action which falls to near zero almost as quickly as
the former index goes to 1.The non-normalised Banzhaf index, indicating American power
over decisions in general, also falls to near zero. A similar pattern is found for the other
countries with power to initiate action falling effectively to zero beyond about q=0.75. These
results also show that the power to prevent action for all these countries becomes near 1
beyond q=0.85. These findings reflect the central importance of the power to act as a property
of a voting body.
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 This analysis has not been done for the Executive Board on the grounds that Table 1 showed a similar pattern
in both bodies and it was assumed that doing so would provide little additional information.
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Figure 3 about here
Figure 4 graphs the relationship between the indices for the United States and the
power to act, for the Board of Governors, from Table 2. It suggests there is a common
interest between the United States and the IMF in the choice of majority requirement. The
point at which US voting power and its power to initiate action are at a maximum is where
the Board of Governors’ power to act is also a maximum, when q=0.5. This means the US
losing its veto but its formal power to prevent action is still quite high at 76%, compared with
the corresponding figure for Japan of less than 17%.
Figure 4 about here
8. An Iterative Procedure for Choosing the Weights to Achieve a Given
Distribution of Power
In designing a system of weighted voting, weights ought to be allocated to members
in such a way as to bring about the desired distribution of voting power27. Power indices
enable this to be done numerically by means of an iterative process by which the weights are
successively updated, from an initial guess, and the power indices recalculated until they
achieve preassigned values. The values required for the power indices are predetermined as a
design property of the voting system28.
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 There is some discussion of this issue in Nurmi [24]. An iterative procedure similar to the one described here
is proposed in Laruelle and Widgren [18].
28
 For example a natural criterion to use in international organisations is the equalisation of voting power among
citizens of different countries; this has been used as a basic principle for the reweighting of votes in the
European Union Council of Ministers by Felsenthal and Machover [7]. In the current paper, I use the criterion of
equalising power to members' shares in total votes, as given in the Appendix to the IMF Annual Report for
1999, although I do not suggest this to be the only possible approach to the governance of the IMF. It is
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Let it be required that member i should possess a voting power of di, where d i∑ =1.
The problem is to find weights that have associated power indices, βi , such that βi = di, for
all i. Denote the required power, the weights and corresponding power indices, as functions
of the weights, by the vectors d, w and β(w).
Let the weights after p iterations be denoted by the  vector w(p), and corresponding
power indices by the vector of functions β(w(p)). The iterative procedure consists of an intial
guess w(0) and an updating rule:
w
(p+1)
 = w
(p)
 + λ(d - β(w(p))
for some appropriate scalar λ>0. If the procedure converges to a vector, w*, then that will be
the desired weight vector, since then: w*=w* + λ(d - β(w*)) and d = β(w*).
Convergence can be defined in terms of a measure of the distance between β(w(p)) and
d and a stopping criterion. The simple sum of squares measure (βi(p)∑ − d i)2  with a suitable
stopping criterion has been found to work well.
9. The Choice of Weights
Table 3 shows the results of applying the iterative procedure described in the last
section to the choice of voting weights in the IMF. The iterative procedure (which has also
been used in Leech [21]) was applied here using the algorithm for the Banzhaf index
described in Leech [22]; full convergence was achieved with a simple sum of squares
distance function and a stopping rule which required it to be less than 10-15. It has been
                                                                                                                                                       
appropriate since in the IMF Annual Reports, each member's voting weight is referred to as its power and
therefore it is of interest to investigate what weights would actually give rise to these powers.
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applied to both the Board of Governors and the Executive Board for both ordinary decisions
and special majorities. As is to be expected, the resulting weights are very different for the
two majority requirements. As before the results for the two bodies are broadly similar.
Table 3 about here
For ordinary decisions, the voting weight of the United States should be reduced to
under15 percent, and the voting weight of the other member countries increased slightly .in
order to achieve the levels of voting power given in the appendix to the IMF Annual Report
for 1999: United States 17.55, Japan 6.3, Germany 6.15, etc. However for 85% special
majority decisions, in order to achieve these values for the power index, the weight of the
United States would have to increase to almost 70 percent and those of all other countries
reduced substantially.
10. Conclusions
In the introduction I posed four specific questions about voting power in the IMF and
have answered them using power indices: how power is distributed; whether the distribution
of power is different in the Board of Governors and the Executive Board; what difference the
voting majority requirement makes; and what should the voting weights be in order to ensure
a given voting power for each member?
I found that, as far as it is possible to make direct comparisons - for the largest five
countries which appoint their own directors, and given the bloc votes of the elected directors
- the formal distribution of power arising from weighted voting is broadly similar in the two
decision making bodies.
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On the first question of the extent to which the inequality in voting power is in line
with the inequality in the allocation of votes between countries, the main finding is that the
USA possesses considerably more power than voting weight in relation to ordinary decisions
requiring a simple majority.
The majority requirement was found to have a very strong effect on the distribution of
power. The distribution of power in relation to decisions requiring special supermajorities of
85% is relatively equal. While this majority requirement ensures the United States has a veto
it also limits that country's power to act within the organisation. I show that there is a clear
positive relation between the power to act of the IMF itself and measures of the power of the
United States within it, both being maximised for the 50 percent majority requirement. The
power to the organisation to act is very sensitive to the majority requirement, falling close to
zero for large supermajority requirements.
The fourth question was to find what the weights should be in order to achieve a
given desired power distribution. I presented and used a new algorithm for doing this. The
results of applying this approach depend crucially on the majority requirement and
substantially different voting weights are obtained to give the same power distribution for
ordinary and special-majorities decisions.
The general policy implications of this study are, firstly, that the American insistence
on setting the special majority requirement so high as to retain its own blocking power is not
only damaging to the effectiveness of decision making within the IMF itself but is also
counter productive in reducing the influence of the United States as a member, in terms of
27
formal voting power. Secondly, votes should be allocated to individual members
instrumentally to achieve the required distribution of voting power.
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 Table 1. Votes and Voting Power Indices 1999
Executive Directors Board of Governors
Weight q=50% q=85% Weight q=50% q=85%
USA 17.53 22.27 6.45 USA 17.55 25.40 3.573
Japan 6.29 5.94 5.87 Japan 6.30 5.55 3.565
Germany 6.15 5.81 5.82 Germany 6.15 5.44 3.564
France 5.08 4.80 5.33 France 5.08 4.56 3.538
UK 5.08 4.80 5.33 UK 5.08 4.56 3.538
(Netherlands) 4.97 4.70 5.28 Italy 3.34 3.03 3.314
(Belgium) 4.49 4.24 4.98 Saudi Arabia 3.31 3.00 3.305
(Mexico) 4.36 4.12 4.89 Canada 3.02 2.74 3.209
(Italy) 4.27 4.03 4.83 Russia 2.82 2.56 2.871
(Canada) 3.78 3.57 4.42 Netherlands 2.45 2.23 2.799
(Denmark) 3.59 3.38 4.25 China 2.22 2.02 2.698
(Australia) 3.41 3.21 4.08 India 1.98 1.80 2.538
Saudi  Arabia 3.31 3.12 3.99 Switzerland 1.64 1.50 2.252
(Thailand) 3.22 3.04 3.90 Australia 1.54 1.40 2.146
(Angola) 3.19 3.01 3.87 Belgium 1.48 1.34 2.078
Russia 2.82 2.66 3.49 Spain 1.45 1.32 2.050
(Egypt) 2.85 2.69 3.53 Brazil 1.45 1.32 2.044
(Switzerland) 2.67 2.52 3.34 Venezuela 1.27 1.15 1.837
(Brazil) 2.52 2.37 3.17 Mexico 1.23 1.12 1.795
(India) 2.46 2.32 3.10 Sweden 1.14 1.04 1.682
(Iran) 2.44 2.30 3.08 Argentina 1.01 0.92 1.510
China 2.22 2.09 2.83 Indonesia 0.99 0.91 1.486
(Chile) 2.01 1.89 2.58 Austria 0.90 0.82 1.352
(Gabon) 1.19 1.12 1.57 ... ... ... ...
Sum 99.9 100 100 Sum 100 100 100
Exec Directors 24 Members 178
Notes: Banzhaf Power Indices. All figures are percentages. Votes do not sum exactly to 100 in the Executive
Directors because members who did not cast their votes were not represented. Names in brackets are the
countries of the Executive Director elected by a group; the number of votes is that of the group. Names not in
brackets are countries with an elected director in a group of one.
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Figure 1. The Effect of the Majority Requirement on the Voting Power, β
    i, of the
Largest Five Members
0.0000
0.0500
0.1000
0.1500
0.2000
0.2500
0.3000
Majority Requirement q      
USA 0.2540 0.1755 0.1594 0.1124 0.0818 0.0615 0.0477 0.0357 0.0342 0.0311 0.0056
Japan 0.0555 0.0630 0.0668 0.0686 0.0648 0.0564 0.0466 0.0357 0.0341 0.0311 0.0056
Germany 0.0544 0.0615 0.0650 0.0670 0.0638 0.0560 0.0464 0.0356 0.0341 0.0311 0.0056
Series5 0.0456 0.0508 0.0526 0.0551 0.0549 0.0513 0.0446 0.0354 0.0339 0.0311 0.0056
0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00
Table 2. The Effect of the Majority Requirement: the Power to Act and the Powers of USA
and Japan
USA Japan
Votes: 17.55 6.30
Majority
Requ q:
PTA Bz(NN) PPA PIA Bz(NN) PPA PIA
50 0.5000 0.7638 0.7638 0.7638 0.1670 0.1670 0.1670
55 0.3609 0.6641 0.9201 0.5196 0.1812 0.2510 0.1418
60 0.2194 0.4315 0.9831 0.2764 0.1802 0.4107 0.1155
65 0.1011 0.2018 0.9982 0.1122 0.1229 0.6079 0.0683
70 0.0316 0.0632 0.9999 0.0326 0.0502 0.7939 0.0259
75 0.0058 0.0116 1 0.0058 0.0108 0.9265 0.0054
80 0.0005 0.0010 1 0.0005 0.0010 0.9845 0.0005
85 1.24473E-05 2.48945E-05 1 1.24474E-05 2.48418E-05 0.9979 1.2421E-05
90 6.7550E-08 1.351E-07 1 6.75502E-08 1.35069E-07 0.9998 6.75345E-08
95 6.4324E-11 1.28668E-10 1 6.43338E-11 1.28665E-10 1 6.43324E-11
100 2.6101E-54 5.2202E-54 1 2.6101E-54 5.2202E-54 1 2.6101E-54
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Figure 2: The Effect of the Majority Requirement on the Power to Act of the Board of
Governors
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Figure 3. The Effect of the Majority Requirement on Coleman’s Indices,  the Power
of a Member to Prevent Action and to Initiate Action, and the Non-normalised Banzhaf
Index: Top 5 Members
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Figure 4. Relationship between US Power and the Board of Governors' Power to Act
0.0000
0.1000
0.2000
0.3000
0.4000
0.5000
0.6000
0.7000
0.8000
0.9000
1.0000
0.0000 0.0500 0.1000 0.1500 0.2000 0.2500 0.3000 0.3500 0.4000 0.4500 0.5000
Power To  Act PTA         
USA Bz(NN)
USA PPA
USA PIA
35
Table 3: The Choice of Weights
Executive Board Board of Governors
Banzhaf Weight Banzhaf Weight
Power q=50% q=85% Power q=50% q=85%
USA 17.55 14.9 67.45 USA 17.55 14.06 69.78
Japan 6.3 6.45 2.44 Japan 6.30 6.53 2.20
Germany 6.15 6.3 2.38 Germany 6.15 6.38 2.16
France 5.08 5.23 1.99 France 5.08 5.27 1.82
UK 5.08 5.23 1.99 UK 5.08 5.27 1.82
(Netherlands) 4.98 5.13 1.95 Italy 3.34 3.48 1.23
(Belgium) 4.5 4.64 1.77 Saudi Arabia 3.31 3.45 1.21
(Mexico) 4.36 4.5 1.72 Canada 3.02 3.15 1.11
(Italy) 4.28 4.42 1.69 Russia 2.82 2.94 1.04
(Canada) 3.79 3.92 1.5 Netherlands 2.45 2.56 0.91
(Denmark) 3.59 3.71 1.42 China 2.22 2.32 0.82
(Australia) 3.42 3.54 1.36 India 1.97 2.06 0.73
Saudi  Arabia 3.31 3.43 1.32 Switzerland 1.64 1.72 0.61
(Thailand) 3.22 3.33 1.28 Australia 1.54 1.61 0.57
(Angola) 3.19 3.3 1.27 Belgium 1.48 1.54 0.55
Russia 2.82 2.92 1.12 Spain 1.45 1.52 0.54
(Egypt) 2.86 2.96 1.14 Brazil 1.45 1.51 0.54
(Switzerland) 2.67 2.77 1.06 Venezuela 1.27 1.32 0.47
(Brazil) 2.52 2.61 1.01 Mexico 1.23 1.29 0.46
(India) 2.46 2.55 0.98 Sweden 1.14 1.19 0.43
(Iran) 2.45 2.54 0.98 Argentina 1.01 1.06 0.38
China 2.22 2.3 0.89 Indonesia 0.99 1.04 0.37
(Chile) 2.01 2.09 0.8 Austria 0.90 0.94 0.33
(Gabon) 1.19 1.24 0.48 ... ... ... ...
Note: The desired powers of the directors in the Executive Board differ slightly from those published
which do not sum precisely to 100. Since it is fundamental to the iterative algorithm that power indices are
equated to target values, and sum to 1, care must be taken to ensure that the latter also sum to 1, so that
convergence is achieved.
